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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Throughout 2008 Palestinian terrorists in Gaza continued to launch 
rocket and mortar attacks on Israeli civilians, and, in response, Israel re-
closed the border at Gaza.1  At times Israel responded to the projectile 
and terrorist attacks emanating from Gaza by reducing the fuel and 
electricity that it supplies to that region.  There was also renewed 
speculation of intensified Israeli military action.2 
As with every flare-up of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the air is thick with 
accusations of violations of international law.  The halls of the United 
Nations resound with voices objecting to the alleged illegality of Israel’s 
behavior, and legal “experts” have taken to the airwaves to raise accusations 
 
 1. Amos Harel, Israel to Shut Gaza Border Crossings Following Qassam Strike, 
HAARETZ, Aug. 23, 2008, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1015144.html. 
 2. Isabel Kershner, Fuel Shortage Shuts Gaza Power Plant, Leaving City Dark, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2008, at A7, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/21/ 
world/middleeast/21mideast.html?scp=6&sq=gazafuel&st=cse. 
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of wrongdoing.3  For instance, U.N. Under Secretary General for Humanitarian 
Affairs, John Holmes asserted that “the effective Israeli isolation of 
Gaza . . . amounts to collective punishment and is contrary to international 
humanitarian law.”4  Similarly, organizations such as Amnesty International 
have issued erroneous and misguided criticism, including “condemning” 
Israel’s imposition of all “blockades” on the Gaza Strip as “collective 
punishment.”5  Jeremy Hobbs, Director of Oxfam International, called 
on Israel “immediately [to] lift its inhumane and illegal siege.”6 
This article explores the many international legal issues raised by the 
Palestinian–Israeli tension along Gaza’s borders.  It first examines legal 
issues raised by Palestinian conduct and then turns to legal issues raised 
by Israeli conduct.  As will be demonstrated, criticisms of Israeli behavior, 
such as those mentioned above, lack any basis in international law.  By 
contrast, Palestinian behaviors that are rarely criticized constitute severe 
violations of international law. 
II.  PALESTINIAN ATTACKS FROM GAZA 
Since Israel’s withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in August 2005, Palestinian 
groups, including Hamas, Fatah, Palestine Islamic Jihad, the Popular 
Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Democratic Front for the 
Liberation of Palestine, and the Popular Resistance Committees have 
launched more than 6,000 mortar bombs and rockets on Israel.7  With no 
more than a handful of possible exceptions, virtually all the attacks have 
been on civilian targets.8 
 
 3. Carolynne Wheeler & Megan Levy, U.N. Condemns Israel’s Deadly Attack on 
Gaza, TELEGRAPH, Mar. 3, 2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1580480/UN-
condemns-Israel’s-deadly-attack-on-Gaza.html. 
 4. Middle East Peace Process Needs Changes on the Ground to Succeed—
UN Envoy, U.N. NEWS CENTRE, Feb. 26, 2008, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story. 
asp?NewsID=25767&Cr=palestin&Cr1. 
 5. Gaza Blockade: ‘Collective Punishment’ Condemned, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL 
UK, Jan. 21, 2008, http://www.amnesty.org.uk/newsdetails.asp?NewsID=17616. 
 6.  Israel’s Blockade Poses Immediate Threat to the Lives of Gaza’s Sick and 
Elderly, Says Oxfam, OXFAM INT’L, Jan. 25, 2008, http://www.oxfam.org/en/node/266. 
 7. The Hamas War Against Israel, ISRAEL MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Sept. 3, 
2008, http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-+Obstacle+to+Peace/Palestinian+terror+since+ 
2000/Missile+fire+from+Gaza+on+Israeli+civilian+targets+Aug+2007.htm. 
 8. Over the past seven years hundreds of people were hurt and a number killed by 
Qassam rockets fired into the western Negev town of Sderot and the city of Ashkelon, 
including Roni Yihye, 47, father of four and a student at Sapir College, killed 
on February 27, 2008, when a Qassam rocket exploded in a parking lot near the campus 
in Sderot.  Thirty-five-year-old Shir-El Friedman was killed on May 21, 2007; Jacob 
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A cease-fire agreement between Israel and Hamas from June 19 to 
December 19, 2008, greatly reduced, but failed to eliminate entirely, attacks 
on Israeli civilian targets.  During the cease-fire, Palestinian terrorists 
launched 329 Qassam rocket and mortar bomb and missile 
attacks.9  Infolive.tv reported on July 7, 2008, that Hamas spokesman 
Fawzi Barhoum had declared an end to the cease-fire,10 although this 
declaration was clearly premature.11 
While several Israeli cities and towns have been attacked, the brunt of 
the Palestinian assault has been borne by the town of Sderot, which has 
been bombarded by terrorist projectiles an average of more than twice a 
day during the last two and a half years.12  The attacks have killed several 
residents and injured dozens of others.  The attacks have destroyed houses 
and public buildings such as kindergartens. The residents are so 
traumatized that three-quarters of all Sderot children between the ages of 
four and eighteen suffer from post-traumatic anxiety.13 
III.  ILLEGALITY OF PALESTINIAN ATTACKS UNDER THE                             
LAWS OF WAR AND TERRORISM 
While Palestinian attacks from Gaza clearly violate many provisions 
of international law, the attacks have drawn little more than pro forma 
objections from international observers.  For instance, a search of the 
U.N. UNISPAL database (the United Nations Information System on the 
Question of Palestine) reveals dozens of U.N. documents issued in the 
last year concerning Gaza. Yet only one document was discovered, a 
 
Jacobov was killed on November 21, 2006, and Ohsri Oz was killed on the 27th of the 
same month.  Nine-year-old Osher Twito lost his leg in an attack on February 10, 2008. 
See Mijal Grinberg & Avi Issacharoff, Woman Killed, Two Wounded in Qassam Rocket 
Strike on Sderot, HAARETZ, May 22, 2007, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/ 861 
946.html; Shelly Paz, A Man of Courage, JERUSALEM POST, May 28, 2007, http://www. 
jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1178708695334&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FSho
wFull; The Hamas War Against Israel: A Diary–February 2008, ISRAEL MINISTRY OF 
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Feb. 29, 2008, http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism. 
 9. Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Israel Intelligence Heritage 
and Commemoration Center, The Six Months of the Lull Arrangement, Dec. 2008, 
http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/malam_multimedia/English/eng_n/pdf/hamas_e017.pdf. 
 10. Hamas Says Truce is Over, (Infolive.tv broadcast July 7, 2008) http://www. 
infolive.tv/en/infolive.tv-25286-israelnews-exclusive-hamas-says-truce-over. 
 11. Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center at the Israel Intelligence Heritage 
and Commemoration Center, supra note 9.  
 12. See Steven Erlanger, At Gaza’s Edge, Israelis Fear Rockets’ Whine, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 9, 2008, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/09/world/middleeast/ 
09israel.html; The Sunday Times, Close to the Edge, THE TIMES ONLINE, Sept. 2, 2007,  
http://www.timesonline. co.uk/tol/news/weather/world/middle_east/article2347909.ece. 
 13. Mijal Grinberg & Eli Ashkenazi, Study: Most Sderot Kids Exhibit Post-
Traumatic Stress Symptoms, HAARETZ, Jan. 17, 2008, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/ 
spages/945489.html. 
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letter from Israeli diplomats to senior U.N. officials following a Palestinian 
terror attack,14 of which the primary and direct focus was Palestinian 
violations of international law.15 This disturbing silence cannot be 
justified on the grounds that controversy exists regarding the legality of 
Palestinian actions since it is abundantly clear that the Palestinian attacks 
are contrary to the standards of international law. 
The Palestinian attacks violate one of the most basic rules of international 
humanitarian law: the rule of distinction, which requires combatants to 
aim all their attacks at legitimate targets—enemy combatants or objects 
that contribute to enemy military actions.16  Violations of the rule of 
distinction—attacks deliberately aimed at civilians or protected objects 
as such—are war crimes.17 
One of the corollaries of the rule of distinction is a ban on the use of 
weapons that are incapable, under the circumstances, of being properly 
aimed only at legitimate targets.18  The rockets and projectile weapons 
being used by the Palestinian attackers are primitive weapons that cannot 
be aimed at specific targets and must be launched at the center of urban 
areas.  This means that the very use of the weapons, under current 
circumstances, violates international law. 
Consequently, each one of the 10,000 terrorist rockets and mortars19 
by Palestinian terrorists on civilian targets in Israeli towns is a war 
crime. The terror squads carrying out the attacks, as well as their 
commanders, bear criminal responsibility for these war crimes.  Indeed, 
 
 14. U.N. GAOR, 62nd Sess., U.N. Doc. A/62/857-S/2008/367 (June 6, 2008). 
 15. Id. 
 16. See YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF 
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT, 82 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2004). 
 17. Id. at 115.  For ICRC’s study of the rule of distinction, see JEAN-MARIE 
HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWARD- BECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN 
LAW (Cambridge Univ. Press 2005) [hereinafter ICRC Rules]. While it is not clear that 
there is a state of Palestine or that the Palestinian attacks may be attributed to state 
actors, the Palestinian attackers are still bound by international humanitarian law.  It is 
generally acknowledged that non-state actors are bound by the rules of law such 
as distinction and proportionality. See LISBETH ZEGVELD, ACCOUNTABILITY OF ARMED 
OPPOSITION GROUPS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2002). 
 18. See DINSTEIN, supra note 16, at 55.  For a commonly cited version of this 
application of the rule of distinction, see Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and 
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art 
52, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Geneva Protocol]. 
 19. Steve Huntley, U.S. Tough on Israel, Light on Palestinians, CHICAGO SUN-
TIMES, May 15, 2009, at 26, available at http://www.suntimes.com/news/huntley/ 
1574877,CST-EDT-hunt15.article. 
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criminal responsibility for these crimes extends up the chain of command to 
the most senior officials in the terror groups who have approved these 
rocket attacks.  Under the rules of command responsibility, senior Hamas 
leaders, such as Khaled Mashal, who insisted on a continuation of the 
rocket attacks in response to “Zionist crimes,”20 are among the parties 
guilty of war crimes.21 
The Palestinian attacks, because they are intended to kill or seriously 
injure civilians in order to intimidate a population, are also terrorist acts 
within the scope of the International Convention for the Suppression of 
the Financing of Terrorism.22  So long as the acts are committed by non-
nationals of the target state,23 Articles 2(4)-(5) extend liability to all those 
who: 
• attempt to commit;   
• participate as accomplices;   
• direct or organize terrorist acts; or   
• contribute to acts by terrorist groups with the knowledge of the 
groups’ intent to commit terror or with the aim of furthering 
their goals. 
Thus, international law considers a large number of Palestinians 
related to the attacks to be terrorists; including the squads of militants 
actually carrying out the rocket attacks, all those who assist the squads 
with organization or financing, and all those who finance the terrorists— 
 
 20. Ian Black, Defiant Hamas Leader Says Attacks on Israel Will Go on Despite Heavy 
Human Cost in Gaza, THE GUARDIAN, May 30, 2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/ 
world/2007/may/30/israel. 
 21. Command responsibility extends to those who command subordinates 
committing crimes where the commander orders the war crimes, or has actual or 
constructive knowledge of the crimes and fails to intervene.  See Geneva Protocol, supra 
note 18, at arts. 86–87.  In this case, superiors in the Hamas organization certainly have 
actual knowledge of the terrorist actions to be committed by subordinates, and even 
where they did not directly order the attacks, they failed to intervene. 
 22. Article 2(1)(b) of the Convention includes in the definition of terrorist acts 
those “intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other 
person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed conflict, when 
the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population.”  
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism art. 2, Jan. 
10, 2000, 39 I.L.M. 270 [hereinafter Suppression of Financing Terrorism]. 
 23. Article 3 includes in the scope of the Convention all terrorist acts except those 
“where the offence is committed within a single State, the alleged offender is a national 
of that State and is present in the territory of that State and no other State has a basis 
under Article 7, paragraph 1, or Article 7, paragraph 2, to exercise jurisdiction.”  
Suppression of Financing Terrorism, supra note 22, art. 3.  Gazan terrorists should not be 
considered as being present or carrying out the offense solely within the territory of 
Israel, but even if one were to dispute this contention, Article 3 would still consider the 
acts as within the scope of the convention since Gazan Palestinians are not nationals of 
Israel. 
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such as the Palestinian Authority—are considered terrorists because they 
are aware of the intent of the terror squads to carry out terrorist acts. 
The Palestinian attacks must also be seen as terrorist attacks under a 
related international convention: the International Convention for the 
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings.  This convention makes it a crime to 
bomb public places (such as city streets) with the intent to kill civilians.  
This Convention relates to bombings carried out by persons that are non-
nationals of the state of which the victims are nationals.24  Also under 
this Convention, the Palestinian attackers are considered international 
terrorists and Israel is required to assume criminal jurisdiction over them.  
Additionally, other states party to the Convention, such as the United 
States, Russia, Turkey and France, must cooperate to help combat such 
Palestinian terrorist acts. 
Palestinian authorities in Gaza also violate anti-terrorism provisions of 
international law by providing a safe haven for Palestinian terrorists.  
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1566, which was adopted by the 
authority granted in Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, and is therefore 
binding international law for all states, requires states to deny safe haven 
to “any person who supports, facilitates, participates or attempts to 
participate in the financing, planning, preparation or commission of 
terrorist acts or provides safe havens.”25  Similarly, Security Council 
Resolution 1373, also a Chapter VII resolution, requires states to “deny 
safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist acts, 
or provide safe havens.”26  Together, these documents establish that, under 
international law, providing a safe haven for terrorists is itself a criminal 
terrorist act.  Thus, all Palestinian governing authorities in Gaza, whether 
directly involved in terror attacks or not, are criminal terrorists under 
international law by virtue of their willing provision to provide a safe 
haven for terrorists. 
Palestinian war crimes do not end with terrorism and violations of the 
rules of distinction.  As will be discussed in section VI below, Palestinian 
terrorists and fighters in Gaza have almost certainly violated the 
international humanitarian rule against perfidy.27  In addition, a consortium 
 
 24. International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings art. 6, 
Dec. 15, 1997, 37 I.L.M., 249. 
 25. S.C. Res. 1566, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1566 (Oct. 8, 2004). 
 26. S.C. Res. 1373, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001). 
 27. Perfidy is defined as “[a]cts inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him 
to believe that he is entitled to, or is obliged to accord, protection under the rules of 
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of Palestinian terrorist groups have held Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit 
incommunicado and out of reach of the International Committee of the 
Red Cross since 2006.  This is a clear violation of international law 
concerning prisoners of war. 
IV. ILLEGALITY OF PALESTINIAN ATTACKS UNDER                                           
THE GENOCIDE CONVENTION 
In carrying out their attacks on Israeli Jews as part of a larger aim to 
kill Jews, as demonstrated by the Hamas Covenant, also known as the 
Hamas Charter, many of the Palestinian terrorists are also violating the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide. Under 
Article 1 of the Genocide Convention, Israel and other signatories are 
required to “prevent and punish”28 persons who carry out such genocidal 
acts, and those who conspire with them, incite them to kill, and are 
complicit with their actions.29  The Convention thus requires Israel to 
prevent and punish both the terrorists themselves and leading figures that 
have publicly supported the Palestinian attacks. Article 2 of the 
Convention defines any killing with intent “to destroy, in whole or in 
part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such” as an act of 
genocide.30 
The Hamas attacks fall within this definition of genocide.  The Covenant 
of Hamas explicitly advocates a religious holy war aimed at creating a 
regional Islamic entity encompassing the territory of Israel and the 
disputed areas.31  The Hamas Covenant not only calls for the movement 
to liberate Palestine, and in so doing to “raise the banner of Allah over 
every inch of Palestine” (Article 6),32 but also demonstrates anti-Semitic, 
murderous intent.  Article 7, for instance, states “the Day of Judgment 
will not come about until Moslems fight the Jews [killing the Jews], 
when the Jew will hide behind stones and trees.  The stones and trees 
will say O Moslems, O Abdulla, there is a Jew behind me, come and kill 
him.”33  The text is infused with repulsive terminology such as, for 
example, the reference to “Zionist Nazi[s].”34  The Covenant’s Preamble 
 
international law applicable in armed conflict, with intent to betray that confidence . . .” 
See Geneva Protocol, supra note 18, art. 37. 
 28. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 1, 
Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. 
 29. Id. art. 6. 
 30. Id. art. 2. 
 31. The Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas), HAMAS CHARTER, 
Aug. 18, 1988, art. 6, http://www.mideastweb.org/hamas.htm. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. art. 31. 
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also assures the world that “our struggle against the Jews is very great 
and very serious,” forecasting “Israel will exist and will continue to exist 
until Islam will obliterate it, just as it obliterated others before it.”35 
The murderous intent of Hamas has been translated into a political 
program openly aimed at obliterating the Jewish state, as well as a constant 
stream of terrorist murders. During the three and a half years of fighting 
from September 2000 until March 2004, Hamas perpetrated 425 terrorist 
attacks. From those attacks, 377 Israelis were murdered and 2,076 
civilians and soldiers were wounded.36  Among the most infamous of 
these atrocities were: the June 1, 2001, suicide bombing of a Tel Aviv 
discotheque, in which twenty-one people were murdered and 120 were 
wounded; and the March 27, 2002, suicide bombing of a hotel in 
Netanya on the first night of Passover, in which thirty people were 
murdered and 140 were wounded.37  In this context it is not surprising 
that Hamas has failed to prevent projectile attacks during the six-month 
period of calm (Tahadiya).38 
V.  LIMITED ISRAELI COUNTER-MEASURES 
In contrast to the illegal Palestinian attacks from Gaza and the 
international silence that has greeted them, Israeli counter-measures have 
been both legally and, paradoxically, widely condemned.  This regrettable 
pattern of largely overlooking actual Palestinian wrongdoing under 
international law, while vigorously condemning supposed Israeli wrongdoing, 
is tragically not unique to the situation in Gaza, but rather a persistent 
theme in the broader Arab–Israeli conflict. 
Israel’s responses to Palestinian terrorist attacks and war crimes have 
been limited to far less than the full measure of actions Israel could have 
legally undertaken. Indeed, as will be demonstrated, Israel’s responses 
may be properly criticized on the grounds of international law, if at all, 
for being insufficient rather than excessive. 
 
 35. Id. at pmbl. 
 36. Hamas terrorist attacks, ISRAEL MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Mar. 22, 2004, 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-+Obstacle+to+Peace/Terror+Groups/Hamas+ 
terror+attacks+22-Mar-2004.htm. 
 37. Id. 
 38. “A tahadiya is roughly defined [in Arabic] as a temporary cessation of 
violence that can be ended at any time for any reason.”  Frank Salvato, Ceasefires in 
Islam: Not Always What They Seem to Be, BASICSPROJECT.ORG, http://www. basicsproject.org/ 
radical_islam_terrorism/ideology/tahadiya_houdna.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2009) (emphasis 
added). 
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Israel’s primary measures of defending itself against Palestinian 
attacks from Gaza have included: 
• sealing off its borders with the Gaza Strip; 
• use of naval forces to monitor for and protect against terrorist 
attacks; 
• small-scale infantry and armored incursions to combat Palestinian 
snipers and  bombers; 
• targeted air strikes on a small number of support, command, and 
control targets; 
• economic sanctions such as the withholding of Israeli fuel; and 
• refusal to permit the use of Israel as a transit point for most 
non-emergency items. 
Although there have been Palestinian casualties, most of the casualties 
have been Palestinian combatants.39  In addition, Israel continues, as it 
has since its withdrawal from the Gaza Strip (and prior to that, by 
agreement with the PLO under the Oslo Accords), to maintain control of 
Gaza’s airspace and coastal waters.  By agreement with the Palestinian 
Authority and with third parties, Israel also maintains a closed-circuit 
camera at the Palestinian–Egyptian border crossing at Rafah to monitor 
entries and exits into the Gaza Strip.40  For its part, Egypt has generally 
kept the border closed between itself and the Gaza Strip, except for 
extensive arms smuggling through tunnels under the border.41 
Remarkably, even while engaged in these limited measures against 
Palestinian attacks from the Gaza Strip—notwithstanding the fact that 
the Gaza Strip is under the control of a terrorist organization as defined 
by the U.S. Department of State—Israel has continued to supply 
economic and humanitarian aid to Gaza.  Israel provides fuel, electricity 
and water to the Gaza Strip, as well as medical services to seriously ill 
Gaza residents.42  Israel has facilitated the travel of Gazans, such as 
students, 43 to Europe and other destinations by permitting them to enter 
 
 39. Rory McCarthy, 19 Palestinians Killed in Raid on Gaza, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 
16, 2008, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/jan/16/international.mainsection1. 
 40. Erik Schechter, Prisoners of Gaza, JERUSALEM POST, Jan. 21, 2008, http://www. 
jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull&cid=1200572509800. 
 41. Egypt Finds Seven Smuggling Tunnels, Arms Cache Near Gaza Border, 
HAARETZ, June 25, 2008, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/996189.html. 
 42. EU: Israel Resumes Supply of Fuel to Gaza Power Plant, HAARETZ, Mar. 16, 
2008, http://www. haaretz.com/hasen/spages/975620.html; ISRAEL MINISTRY OF FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS, HUMANITARIAN AID TO GAZA DURING IDF OPERATION (Jan. 18, 2009), 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Communiques/2009/Humanitarian_aid_to_Gaza 
_following_6_month_calm.htm. 
 43. A brief contretemps erupted in May 2008, when U.S. officials revoked Fulbright 
scholarships to Palestinian students in Gaza on the grounds that Israel was not permitting the 
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Israeli territory and use Israeli transit facilities.44  Israel has also provided 
funds to the Palestinian Authority, which has, in turn, disbursed them in 
Gaza.45 
Unfortunately, Hamas and other Palestinian terrorist groups utilized 
the cease-fire, as well as the limited nature of Israeli counter-strikes, to 
arm themselves for future terrorist strikes against Israeli Jews and armed 
actions against Israel.46  It is therefore quite possible that Israel will be 
forced to engage in more intense counter-measures in the future. 
VI. FLAWED CRITICISMS MADE BY OPPONENTS OF ISRAEL 
Traditional opponents of Israel have criticized Israel for alleged 
violations of international law.  One of the strongest sources of criticism 
 
students to travel through Israeli territory in order to travel abroad.  Ethan Bronner, Confined, 
Gazans Lose Their Funds For Study in U.S, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2008, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/30/world/middleeast/30gaza.html?_r=1&scp=1&sq=U.S.%
20Withdraws%20Fulbright%20Grants%20to%20Gaza,%20&st=cse (titled U.S. Withdraws 
Fulbright Grants to Gaza).  Ironically, one of the reasons U.S. officials wanted the Gazan 
students to enter Israeli territory was in order to examine their eligibility for travel visas to the 
U.S. at the U.S. Consulate in Jerusalem.  Adam Entous, Israel Eases Restrictions on Gaza 
Fulbright Students, REUTERS, June 4, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/ 
idUSL0488937 [hereinafter, Entous, Israel Eases Restrictions].  The irony here is that the 
U.S. stopped interviewing Palestinian students in Gaza in 2003 when Palestinian terrorists 
attacked a delegation of U.S. diplomats travelling through Gaza to interview Fulbright 
applicants, killing three.  Nidal Al-Mughrabi, Gaza Bomb Kills 3 Americans, CNN.COM, Oct. 
16, 2003, http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/10/15/mideast.blast/.  Disturbingly, 
American officials neglected to note this very salient fact while pooh-poohing Israeli security 
concerns about travel by Gazans through Israel.  Israel permitted four of the seven students to 
travel through Israel, denying the other three entry on security grounds.  The State Department 
publicly lambasted Israel and sent officials to interview the remaining three at the border of 
Gaza.  All seven received visas, and Israel permitted all seven to exit Gaza through Israeli 
territory.  Yet on August 5, 2008, the State Department cancelled the visas for the three 
Gazans whom Israel had fingered as having security issues.  The authors have been unable to 
find evidence of any apology by the State Department to Israel for the unfounded accusations.  
Ashraf Khalil, Gaza Strip: The Fulbright mystery, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2008, 
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/babylonbeyond/2008/08/gaza-strip-the.html.  However, the 
State Department did admit that its initial revocation of the scholarships had not been due to 
Israeli refusal of an American request to allow the students transit and that, rather, the State 
Department “had erred by not approaching the Israeli government earlier to help the seven 
students.”  See Entous, Israel Eases Restrictions supra. 
 44. Griff Ritte, Isr.l Revisits Limitations on Gaza Students, WASH. POST, May 31, 
2008, at A10. 
 45. Hamas: Our forces paid from tax revenue transferred by Israel, HAARETZ, 
Mar. 13, 2007, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/837063.html. 
 46. Hamas: Arms smuggling to continue despite gaza truce, HAARETZ, June 20, 
2008, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/994790.html. 
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has been the Office of the “Special Rapporteur on the Situation of 
Human Rights in the Palestinian Territories Occupied Since 1967” in the 
U.N. Human Rights Council. The Special Rapporteur’s office was 
created by the Human Rights Commission (since replaced by the Human 
Rights Council) in 1993 to issue one-sided criticisms of Israel; the mandate 
specifies that the Rapporteur is “[t]o investigate Israel’s [alleged] violations 
of . . . international law, international humanitarian law and the Geneva 
Convention . . . in the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967,” 
but does not request that he also investigate Palestinian violations.47  The 
Rapporteur has used the one-sidedness of this mandate to justify anti-
Israel bias in his reporting and has publicly and repeatedly interpreted 
his mandate as requiring him to criticize only Israel.48  As befits the 
Rapporteur’s bias, the Rapporteur has ignored the fact that he has no 
jurisdiction to investigate alleged Israeli wrongdoing in Gaza.  Since 
Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza in 2005, no credible legal argument can 
be made that Gaza is a “Palestinian territor[y] occupied by Israel since 
1967.”  The Rapporteur, therefore, lacks jurisdiction. 
Nonetheless, the Rapporteur’s reports have been replete with inaccurate 
and biased criticism of alleged Israeli wrongdoing in Gaza.  John Dugard, 
who served as the Special Rapporteur from the inception of the post in 
1993 until 2008, issued a statement on January 18, 2008, criticizing 
Israeli defense measures as illegal.  Firstly, Dugard claimed that Israel’s 
attack on a Hamas headquarters in a Palestinian Interior Ministry building 
in Gaza was illegal because the target was “near a wedding venue with 
what must have been foreseen loss of life and injury to many civilians.”49  
However, the Palestinian Interior Ministry building was certainly a 
legitimate target under the rules of distinction since it makes a definite 
contribution to Hamas’ hostilities.  The fact that one Palestinian civilian 
lost her life in the Israeli strikes is unfortunate,50 but certainly not a 
violation of the rule of proportionality, which authorizes collateral damage 
to civilians where justified by military necessity.51 
Secondly, Dugard asserted that Israel’s closure of its borders at the 
Gaza Strip constitutes illegal “collective punishment.”52  Yet, there is 
 
 47. U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm’n on Human Rights Res. 
1993/3, 49th Sess., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/RES/1993/2 (A+B) (Feb. 19, 1993). 
 48. Anti-Israel Resolutions at the HRC, U.N. WATCH, http://www.unwatch.org/ 
site/c.bdKKISNqEmG/b.3820041. 
 49. Isabel Kershner, Israeli Airstrike in Gaza Kills 2 Hamas Members, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 20, 2008, at A14, available at  http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/20/world/ middleeast/ 
20mideast.html?scp=4&sq=raid%20on%20gaza%20interior%20ministry%20building&st=cse. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See, e.g., JUDITH GARDAM, NECESSITY, PROPORTIONALITY AND THE USE OF 
FORCE BY STATES, 88–108 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2004). 
 52. Id. 
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nothing in international law that requires Israel to maintain open borders 
with a hostile territory, whatever its sovereign status.  Similarly, as will 
be discussed in section VI below, exercising legal counter-measures 
against a hostile entity does not constitute “collective punishment” under 
international law.  Dugard’s refusal to level the same charge against Egypt, 
which also closes its borders  at the Gaza Strip, at times, underlines the 
bias that accompanies this legally inaccurate statement. 
At the same time, in sharp contradiction to the dictates of international 
law, Dugard offered several invalid excuses for Palestinian terrorism.  In 
his report of January 21, 2008, Dugard wrote that: 
[c]ommon sense . . . dictates that a distinction must be drawn between acts of 
mindless terror, such as acts committed by Al Qaeda, and acts committed in the 
course of a war of national liberation against colonialism, apartheid or military 
occupation . . . . They must be understood as being a painful but inevitable 
consequence of colonialism, apartheid or occupation.53 
Dugard failed to mention that such a distinction is forbidden by international 
law.  Security Council Resolution 1566 specifically states that illegal 
terrorist acts “are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of 
a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious, or other 
similar nature.”54 
In a similar vein, in the same report, Dugard attempted to downplay 
Palestinian terrorism by omitting all mention of international conventions 
and resolutions violated by Palestinian terrorism.  Instead, he inaccurately 
accused Israel of committing illegal terrorism by, for example, targeting 
military strikes at Palestinian terrorists and flying planes at supersonic 
speed.55 Needless to say, there is no international law treaty, U.N. 
resolution, or international legal custom that renders such Israeli acts as 
“terrorism,” or illegal in any other way. 
Difficult as it is to envisage, Richard Falk, Dugard’s successor to the 
post of Special Rapporteur, has continued in Dugard’s path in bias and 
 
 53. John Dugard, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human 
Rights in the Palestinian Territories Occupied Since 1967, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/17 
(Jan. 21, 2008) (prepared by John Dugard). 
 54. S.C. Res. 1566, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1566 (Oct. 8, 2004). 
 55. Special Rapporteur, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of 
Human Rights in the Palestinian Territories Occupied Since 1967, ¶¶ 13–14, delivered 
to the Human Rights Council and the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/7/17 (Jan. 
21, 2008). 
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legal inaccuracy.56  Falk has repeatedly and outrageously accused Israel 
of genocide, claiming in 2002 that “Israel is seeking to obliterate the 
existence of the Palestinian people,”57 and in 2007 that he felt “compelled to 
portray the ongoing and intensifying abuse of the Palestinian people by 
Israel”; Falk has compared Israel’s actions to the Holocaust because 
Israeli policies “express so vividly a deliberate intention on the part of 
Israel and its allies to subject an entire human community to life-
endangering conditions of utmost cruelty.”58  Shortly after his appointment 
to the post of Special Rapporteur on March 26, 2008,59 Falk defended 
the appropriateness of his comparisons of Israeli treatment of Gazans to 
genocidal Nazi policies.60 
To their credit, some foreign officials, such as Franco Frattini (until 
recently the European Commissioner for Justice, Freedom and Security), 
have correctly defended the legality of the Israeli actions.61  Others, such 
as Dutch Foreign Minister Maxime Verhagen, have criticized U.N. bias 
against Israel.62 
A.  Criticism of Operation Cast Lead of December 2008                                
to January 2009 
Israel was widely criticized for violating international law in the recent 
IDF Operation, known as Operation Cast Lead, which intended to halt 
the onslaught of Hamas-fired rockets on Israel.  Two of the strongest 
allegations were that Israel reacted disproportionately, and that the use of 
white phosphorous (see immediately below) violated international law. 
Though Hamas militants are still firing rockets on Israel, the onslaught 
of these rockets has been substantially reduced since the IDF operation.  
The IDF often used white phosphorous in areas the IDF had deemed that 
it would not contaminate its own soldiers. Further, the use of white 
 
 56. See Statement by Richard Falk, Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in the 
Occupied Territories, U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights (Dec. 27, 2008). 
 57. Editorial, Falk’s Law, JERUSALEM POST, July 23, 2008, http://www.jpost.com/ 
servlet/Satellite?cid=1215331076115&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull. 
 58. Richard Falk, Slouching toward a Palestinian Holocaust, THE TRANSNATIONAL 
FOUNDATION FOR PEACE AND FUTURE RESEARCH, June 29, 2007, http://www.transnational. 
org/Area_MiddleEast/2007/Falk_PalestineGenocide.html. 
 59. Press Release, Human Rights Council, Human Rights Council Elects Advisory 
Committee Members and Approves a Number of Special Procedures Mandate Holders 
(Mar. 26, 2008), http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/9a798adbf322aff38525617b006d88d7/ 
0da4ba56ade85249852574190058d462!OpenDocument. 
 60. See Tim Franks, U.N. Expert Stands by Nazi Comments, BBC NEWS, Apr. 8, 
2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/7335875.stm. 
 61. See Barak Ravid, Italy FM: EU Stance on Israel in Past Swayed by Intolerance 
of Jews, HAARETZ, June 21, 2008, https://www.haaretz.co.il/hasen/spages/994084.html. 
 62. Cnaan Liphshiz, Dutch FM Says Israel Unfairly Singled Out for Criticism by 
UN, HAARETZ, Jan. 22, 2008, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/947090.html. 
WEINER BELL FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/30/2009  9:37 AM 
[VOL. 11:  5, 2009]  The Gaza War of 2009 
  SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 
 19 
phosphorous is quite legal under international law, is used legitimately 
for illumination, and is not seen as a potential cause of death or injury.  
It is a good smokescreen to conceal one’s forces from one’s enemy. 
VII. LEGAL STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO ISRAELI                                   
COUNTER-MEASURES 
It is difficult to evaluate legal objections to Israel’s actions since they 
are often made in conclusive fashion, and without reference to legal 
doctrines or materials that support the charges.  They are also often raised 
out of context.  Additionally, many of the legal criticisms are implicitly 
based upon misinterpretations of the relevant international law, but 
without explicit assertions of the proposed legal doctrine.  Moreover, 
many of the charges are disingenuously based upon misstatements of 
fact or misuse of legal terminology. 
Nonetheless, this essay attempts to construct a rational legal basis for 
criticisms of Israeli behavior and to evaluate these criticisms.  It examines, 
in turn, the four distinct bodies of law that could potentially affect the 
legality of Israeli counter-strikes: 
• the laws of initiating hostilities (jus ad bellum); 
• international humanitarian law, which governs the conduct of 
military actions; 
• the laws of occupied territory, which some have argued applies 
to Israeli actions against Gaza-based terrorists; and 
• human rights laws. 
A careful examination of the relevant law demonstrates that the Israeli 
counter-strikes to date, and the potential future counter-strikes (both 
economic and military), conform to the requirements of international 
law. 
A.  The Legality of Israeli Military Actions under Jus ad Bellum 
The law of jus ad bellum, as codified by the U.N. Charter, bars the use 
of military force against other states under most circumstances.63  Article 
51 of the Charter recognizes the inherent right to self-defense, 
notwithstanding the general ban on the use of force.64 
 
 63. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. 
 64. Id. art. 51. 
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Jus ad bellum does not restrict the use of force in non-international 
conflicts.65 The uncertain legal status of the Gaza Strip66 makes it 
difficult to determine the basis on which Israel’s actions should be 
analyzed.  However, it is certain that Israel has the right to use force in 
defending itself against Palestinian attacks from Gaza. 
Let us suppose that Gaza is an independent sovereignty, and entitled 
to all the rights of states under jus ad bellum, including the general right 
to immunity from armed attacks from other states.  In that case, Israel 
would be entitled to use force against Gaza by authority of the inherent 
right to self-defense, as referenced by Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.  
Gaza would have lost its general immunity from attack by repeatedly 
striking at its neighbor state and Israel’s use of force would therefore be 
permissible on the grounds of self-defense. 
Alternatively, if Gaza is not an independent sovereignty, it can claim 
no rights to immunity from attack under the law of jus ad bellum. Israel 
would not need (though it may be able)67 to invoke the right of self-
defense. 
 
 65. See YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENSE, 213–221 (3d ed. 
2001). 
 66. The Gaza Strip can plausibly be described as sovereign territory of a state of 
Palestine, territory of the Mandate of Palestine without a current sovereign, sovereign 
territory of the State of Israel, or territory without any sovereign whatsoever.  It may be 
subject to a claim of self-determination by the Palestinian Arab people, or by the Jewish 
people (by virtue of the Articles of the Mandate of Palestine).  As is noted elsewhere, 
implausible claims have also been raised that Gaza is under Israeli occupation. 
See discussion infra Part VII.C.1. 
 67. As evidenced by the world’s response to the terrorist attacks on the United 
States on September 11, 2001, most states recognize a right of self-defense against 
attacks from non-sovereign actors, even where the attacks originate and culminate on 
domestic soil (the 9/11 attackers launched their attack from U.S. soil).  In its rightly 
pilloried advisory opinion on Israel’s security barrier, the International Court of Justice 
correctly noted that the Green Line—the cease-fire line separating Jordan and Israel prior 
to 1967—was not an international border.  See Advisory Opinion, Legal Consequences 
of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (July 9, 2004), at 34, 
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/131/1671.pdf.  It then concluded, without 
analysis and contrary to international practice, that Israel lacked a right of self-defense 
against attacks crossing that line.  See Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall 
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion (July 9, 2004), at 63, available 
at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/131/1671.pdf. By that logic, at least until 2005 
when Israel withdrew from Gaza, there was no international boundary between Israel 
and Gaza, and therefore Gaza would not be able to claim the benefits of jus ad bellum.  
The I.C.J. decision also, incorrectly, implies that Israel lacked a right of self-defense 
against Gazan attacks prior to 2005; however, this implication is not terribly important 
since Israel would not need the benefit of self-defense to have the right to use force in 
Gaza.  Id. 
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B.  Legality of Israeli Military Actions under International 
Humanitarian Law 
International humanitarian law regulates the use of force once military 
action is under way, irrespective of its legality under jus ad bellum.  The 
two most basic principles of international humanitarian law are the rules 
of distinction and proportionality;68 Israel’s counter-strikes have abided 
by both. 
1. Distinction and Proportionality 
The rule of distinction, as noted previously, requires aiming attacks 
only at legitimate (e.g., military and support) targets.69  The rule of 
distinction includes elements of intent and expected result; so long as 
one aims at legitimate targets, the rule of distinction permits the attack, 
even if the attack is expected to cause collateral damage to civilians, and 
even if, in retrospect, the attack was a mistake based on faulty intelligence.70 
Israel has aimed its strikes at locations from which rockets have been 
fired,71 Palestinian combatants bearing weapons and transporting arms,72 
Palestinian terrorist commanders,73 and support and command and 
control centers.74  Locations such as Interior Ministry buildings, from 
which Hamas directs some military activities,75 clearly make a 
contribution to Hamas’ military actions; they are therefore legitimate 
targets, even though they also have civilian functions. 
The rule of proportionality operates in conjunction with the rule of 
distinction to limit collateral damage.  While most kinds of collateral 
damage to civilian and other protected targets are permitted according to 
the rule of distinction, the rule of proportionality forbids collateral 
 
 68. See DINSTEIN, supra note 16, at 225. 
 69. Id. at 115. 
 70. Id. 
 71. See Shmulik Hadad, Israel Strikes Qassam Launchers Following Rocket Attack, 
YNET, June 20, 2007, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/1,7340,L-3415347,00.html. 
 72. See IDF Spokesperson, IDF Targets Hamas Cell in the Southern Gaza Strip, 
INDEPENDENT MEDIA REVIEW ANALYSIS, Sept. 5, 2006, http://www.imra.org.il/story. 
php3?id=30840. 
 73. Yuval Azoulay, Abbas: IDF Operations Prevent Progress in Peace Talks, 
HAARETZ, Aug. 22, 2007, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/896224.html. 
 74. IDF Spokesperson, IDF Targets Main Islamic Jihad Weapons Manufacturing 
Facility, July 25, 2006, http://www.imra.org.il/story.php3?id=30264. 
 75. Ken Ellingwood, Israeli Airstrike Sets Ministry in Gaza on Fire, L.A. TIMES, 
June 30, 2006, at 5, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2006/jun/30/world/fg-gaza30. 
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damage that is expected to be excessive in relation to the military need.76  
Prosecutions for war crimes on the basis of disproportionate collateral 
damage are rare, and it is difficult to see how a credible claim can be 
made that any of Israel’s counter-strikes have created disproportionate 
collateral damage.  Certainly, there is no record of any conviction of an 
attacker for excessive collateral damage resulting from attacks like those 
carried out by Israel.  Moreover, as with distinction, the rule of proportionality 
relies upon intent.77  If Israel plans a strike without expected excessive 
collateral damage, the rule of proportionality justifies it, even if, in 
retrospect, Israel erred in its damage estimates. 
All reported Israeli strikes in the December 2008–January 2009 round 
of fighting have been aimed at legitimate targets and none has caused 
excessive collateral damage.  Legal advisors attached to Israeli military 
units review proposed military actions.78  They apply an extremely restrictive 
standard of both distinction and proportionality, in accordance with 
intrusive Israeli Supreme Court rulings that have imposed far stricter 
legal standards on the Israeli military than those found in international 
law.79  It is thus likely that future Israeli measures will continue to abide 
by the rules of distinction and proportionality. 
2. Perfidy and Civilian Shields 
At the same time, it is clear that Palestinian actions in conducting 
military operations from within built-up civilian areas, thereby increasing 
Palestinian casualties, constitute war crimes.  It is important to note that 
Israel is not required to refrain from attacking Palestinian combatants 
simply because they have chosen to hide behind civilians.  As Article 28 
of the Fourth Geneva Convention makes clear, the presence of civilians 
“may not be used to render certain points or areas immune from military 
operations.”80  The article also makes Palestinian attempts to use civilian 
shields unlawful. 
Additionally, the fact that Palestinian terrorists dress as civilians in 
carrying out attacks does not render them immune from attack; it simply 
makes them lawful targets who are also violating international law.  
 
 76. See DINSTEIN, supra note 16, at 120. 
 77. Id. at 122. 
 78. IDF, Chief Military Advocacy, http://dover.idf.il/IDF/English/units/other/advocate/ 
Headquarters/default.htm. 
 79. See, e.g., HCJ 3278/02 Center for the Defense of the Individual v. Commander 
of IDF Forces in the West Bank [2002] IsrSC 57(1) 385, ¶ 23 (requiring Israel Defense 
Forces to abide by standards of Standard Minimum Rules for Treatment of Prisoners, 
even though Israel is not bound by treaty to such rules and they have not been 
demonstrated to be a part of customary international law). 
 80. See Geneva Protocol, supra note 18, art. 28. 
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International humanitarian law forbids perfidy, which, for example, 
means that it is forbidden to feign civilian status while actually being a 
combatant.81 The fact that Palestinian terrorists often dress as, and 
pretend to be, civilians while carrying out attacks makes it highly likely 
that many innocent Palestinian civilians will be accidentally killed in the 
crossfire.  These war crimes are Palestinian, and not Israeli. 
3. Retorsion and Collective Punishment 
In addition to directly regulating the use of force with the rules of 
distinction and proportionality, international humanitarian law also 
provides important rules regarding military acts, such as blockades and 
the imposition of punishment.  Israel’s actions abide by these rules as 
well. 
Israel’s imposition of economic sanctions on the Gaza Strip, such as 
partially withholding fuel supplies and electricity, does not involve the 
use of military force and is therefore a perfectly legal means of responding 
to Palestinian attacks, despite the effects on innocent Palestinian civilians.  
The use of economic and other non-military sanctions as a means of 
disciplining other international actors for their misbehavior is a practice 
known as “retorsion.”82  It is generally acknowledged that any country 
may engage in retorsion.83  Indeed, it is acknowledged that states may 
even go beyond retorsion to carry out non-belligerent reprisals—non-
military acts that would otherwise be illegal (such as suspending flight 
agreements) as counter-measures.84 Since Israel is under no legal 
obligation to engage in trade of fuel (or anything else with the Gaza 
Strip) or to maintain open borders with the Gaza Strip, it may withhold 
commercial items and seal its borders at its discretion, even if intended 
as “punishment” for Palestinian terrorism. 
 
 81. Id. While Israel is not a party to the Protocol, the definition of perfidy is 
considered to reflect customary international law.  See DINSTEIN, supra note 16, at 198. 
 82. Karl Josef Partsch, Retorsion, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 
335, 335–37 (1986); L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 134 (Hersche Lauterpacht ed., 
7th ed. 1952) (1906). 
 83. See ELISABETH ZOLLER, PEACETIME UNILATERAL REMEDIES: AN ANALYSIS OF 
COUNTERMEASURES 7 (1984). 
 84. See generally Lori Fisher Damrosch, Retaliation or Arbitration—or Both? The 
1978 U.S.–France Aviation Dispute, 74 AM. J. INT’L L. 785 (1980). 
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While international law bars “collective punishment,”85 none of Israel’s 
combat actions and retorsions may be considered collective punishment.  
The bar on collective punishment forbids the imposition of criminal-type 
penalties on individuals or groups on the basis of another’s guilt, or the 
commission of acts that would otherwise violate the rules of distinction 
and proportionality, or both.86 None of Israel’s actions involve the imposition 
of criminal-type penalties or the violation of the rules of distinction and 
proportionality.  It is striking that there has never been a prosecution for 
the war crime of collective punishment on the basis of economic sanctions.  
Indeed, many of the critics calling Israel’s withdrawal of economic aid 
“collective punishment” call, or have called, for the imposition of economic 
sanctions or the withdrawal of economic aid against Israel and other 
countries87 or, at least, claim to have “no position on [the legality of] 
punitive economic sanctions and boycotts.”88 
Examples of retorsions are legion in international affairs.  The U.S., 
for example, froze trade with Iran after the 1979 Revolution89 and with 
Uganda in 1978 following accusations of genocide.90  In 2000, fourteen 
European states suspended various diplomatic relations with Austria in 
protest of the participation of Jorg Haider—believed to be a racist—in 
the government.91 Numerous states suspended trade and diplomatic 
relations with South Africa as punishment for apartheid practices.92  In 
none of these cases was the charge of “collective punishment” raised.  
“Punishing” a country with restrictions on international trade is not 
identical to carrying out “collective punishment” in the legal sense. 
 
 85. See Geneva Protocol, supra note 18, art. 75(4)(b).  While Israel is not a party 
to the Protocol, the prohibition on collective punishment is considered to reflect customary 
international law.  See DINSTEIN, supra note 16, at 21. 
 86. See Geneva Protocol, supra note 18, art. 75(4)(b). 
 87. See, e.g., Amnesty International, Sudan: Joint Letter to U.N. Security Council,  
AI Index AFR 54/025/2006, May 25, 2006; Amnesty International,  Nepal: Heads of 
Three Human Rights Organizations Call for Targeted Sanctions, AI Index ASA 
31/019/2006, Apr. 18, 2006; Amnesty International, Cuba: Questions and Answers on 
the Work of Amnesty International, AI Index AFR 25/003/2002, July 15, 2002 (claiming 
disingenuously that “Amnesty International takes no general position on the legitimacy 
of economic sanctions against governments or armed groups anywhere in the world”). 
 88. Amnesty International, Sierra Leone: Cutting the Link Between Diamonds and 
Guns, AI Index AFR 51/027/00, May 31, 2000. 
 89. GEOF SIMONS, IMPOSING ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 147 (1999). 
 90. U.S. Policy Toward Uganda: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Africa of the 
Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 96th Cong. 1 (1979); see also Ralph D. Nurnberger, The U.S. 
and Idi Amin: Congress to the Rescue, 25 AFR. STUD. REV. 49, 49 (1982). 
 91. William Pfaff, Right Turn In Austria—The Haider Chronicles, 127 
COMMONWEAL 8, 8–9 (2000). 
 92. See SIMONS, supra note 89, at 78. 
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4. Closed Borders and Blockades 
Israel is similarly accused of collective punishment for refusing to 
admit to the State of Israel persons from Gaza—both Palestinians and 
foreigners.93  These criticisms have no basis in international law.  There 
is no recorded case of any prosecution for the war crime of collective 
punishment on the basis of refusing a person entry into a country.  
Indeed, there is no general requirement anywhere in international law 
that a state admit foreigners into its borders.  It is acknowledged that 
there are sources in international law that arguably require states to 
admit their own citizens.94  However, Palestinian residents and other 
non-Israelis in Gaza are not Israeli citizens and have no right to enter the 
State of Israel. 
Israel’s right to refuse entry to Palestinians and other foreigners is 
particularly obvious if Gaza is a separate sovereignty.  No state need 
admit citizens of another state into its borders.  But even if Gaza were 
considered sovereign Israeli territory, Israel would be able to control 
entry from Gaza into Israel proper.  This issue is considered below in the 
examination of human rights law.  Similarly, in the next section, we 
consider the potential rights of Gaza residents and foreigners under the 
law of occupation (if one maintains, implausibly, that Gazan territory is 
occupied by Israel); here, too, there is no source of any right to enter 
Israeli territory. 
Israeli control of Gazan airspace and waters is also legal under international 
law.  States generally have the right to claim sovereign control over their 
territorial air and coastal waters.95 For this reason, naval blockades—
such as the one Egypt imposed on Israel in 1967, leading to the Six Day 
War96—are considered to be affronts to the sovereignty of states and acts 
of war.97  However, as previously argued, if Gaza is a separate sovereignty, it 
 
 93. Philip O’Conor, Israeli Collective Punishment of People of Gaza Must be 
Ended, IRISH TIMES, Aug. 21, 2008, http://www.irishtimes.com/newspaper/opinion/ 
2008/0821/1219243749183.html. 
 94. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, at 89, 
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966). 
 95. Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: Final Act, art. 17–26, 
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/121 (Oct. 21, 1982). 
 96. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Events Leading to the Six Day War, 
http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Facts+About+Israel/Israel+in+Maps/ (follow “Events leading to 
the Six Day War” (1967) hyperlink). 
 97. See, e.g., Definition of Aggression, GA Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., 
U.N. Doc. A/9631 (Dec. 14, 1974). 
WEINER BELL FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/30/2009  9:37 AM 
 
26 
has attacked Israel, giving Israel the right to engage in acts of war as 
self-defense.  This means that Israel has the right to blockade Gaza, so 
long as it abides by the general humanitarian rules of blockades, which are 
discussed below. 
Moreover, the Oslo Accords, the 1990s interim peace agreements 
between the PLO and Israel, specify continued Israeli security control 
over Gazan airspace and coastal waters, granting the PLO only limited 
boating and fishing rights in Gazan territorial waters.98  Even if Gaza 
became an independent sovereign state, it is arguably still bound to its 
prior agreements with Israel respecting Israeli security control. 
Critics of Israel who seek to avoid these obvious legal conclusions are 
forced to adopt contradictory positions.  Thus, for example, a group of 
pro-Palestinian activists calling themselves the “Free Gaza” movement 
organized the passage of boats to Gaza in opposition to Israeli security 
control on the grounds that Gaza has a sovereign right to its territorial 
waters with which Israel cannot interfere.99  In other words, the activists 
argued that since Gaza is an independent sovereign, they had the right to 
enter Gaza without asking permission from Israel.  However, when one 
of the activists (Lauren Booth100) decided to exit Gaza by land, she 
found, to her chagrin, that neither Israel nor Egypt was prepared to open 
its borders for her.  She then demanded entry to Israel on the grounds 
that international law guarantees her freedom of movement within a 
country to exit Gaza via Israeli territory.101  In other words, for purposes 
of her sea passage, she argued that Gaza was an independent state; for 
purposes of her land passage, she argued that Gaza was nothing more 
 
 98. THE ISRAELI–PALESTINIAN INTERIM AGREEMENT ON THE WEST BANK AND THE 
GAZA STRIP, ANNEX I PROTOCOL CONCERNING REDEPLOYMENT AND SECURITY 
ARRANGEMENTS (Sept. 28, 1995), http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Guide 
+to+the+Peace+Process/THE+ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN+INTERIM+AGREEMENT+-
+Annex+I.htm. 
 99. News Agencies, ‘Free Gaza’ Blockade-Busting Boats Planning a Second 
Voyage, HAARETZ, Aug. 30, 2008, http:// www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1016517.html. 
 100. Booth is Tony Blair’s sister-in-law and a “media personality” who labels herself a 
human rights activist. See Lauren Booth, http://homepage.mac.com/lauren.booth/lauren/ 
lauren.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2009).  Her human rights activism appears to consist 
primarily of anti-Israeli, pro-Palestinian activity, as well as general opposition to the “war on 
terror.”  Booth’s story of her “imprisonment” in Gaza was contradictory, although in all its 
versions, it placed the blame on Israel.  Booth claimed that Israel said it was impossible for 
her to leave through Israel and that  Egyptian officials were ready to permit her transit through 
Egypt.  Tim Butcher, Lauren Booth Still ‘Trapped’ in Gaza After Protest, TELEGRAPH, Sept. 
3, 2008, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/palestinianauthority/2674870/ 
Lauren-Booth-still-trapped-in-Gaza-after-protest.html. Simultaneously, Booth claimed that 
Israeli puppet-masters were responsible for the “lowly” Egyptian “official’s” decision to deny 
her transit, as she had “heard through contacts Egypt was under pressure from Israel to act that 
way.”  Egypt Won’t Let Blair’s Sister-in-Law Leave Gaza By Land, REUTERS, Sept. 3, 2003, 
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1017539.html. 
 101. See Butcher, supra note 100. 
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than a part of Israel.  Booth eventually exited Gaza through a border 
crossing with Egypt,102 inadvertently underlining the vacuous nature of 
her claim that Israel controls Gaza’s borders and that “[i]t could be days, 
weeks or years before I can leave, depending on the mood of the Israeli 
authorities.”103 
International humanitarian law does place additional duties on parties 
engaging in a boycott to permit transit of relief supplies.  However, as 
will be seen below, these duties are very limited and Israel has abided by 
them. 
C.  The Legality of Israeli Military Actions under the                                 
Laws of Occupation 
1. Is Gaza Occupied? 
Some groups have claimed that the Gaza Strip is “occupied” by Israel 
according to the Fourth Geneva Convention, in which case Israel would 
be required to “ensure the food and medical supplies of the population” 
as well as “agree to relief schemes on behalf of the . . . population” and 
maintain “public health and hygiene.”104 
However, there is no legal basis for maintaining that Gaza is occupied 
territory.  The Fourth Geneva Convention refers to territory as occupied 
where the territory is of another “High Contracting Party” (i.e., a state 
party to the Convention) and the occupier “exercises the functions of 
government” in the occupied territory.105  Yet, the Gaza Strip is not territory 
of another state party to the Convention; Egypt, which previously 
controlled Gaza, is a party to the Convention, but Gaza was never Egyptian 
territory.  And, Israel does not exercise the functions of government—or, 
indeed, any significant functions—in the territory.  It is clear to all that 
the elected Hamas government is the de facto sovereign of the Gaza 
Strip and does not take direction from Israel, or any other state. 
 
 102. A.F.P., Blair’s Sister-in-Law Finally Leaves Gaza, Sept. 20, 2008, http://afp. 
google.com/article/ALeqM5iimV_FzSFDI6xcZ_nnqLYptVnhlQ. 
 103. Orly Halpern, Lauren Booth, Tony Blair’s Sister-in-Law, Stuck in Gaza Strip, 
TIMES (London), Sept. 3, 2008,  http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/middle_east/ 
article4668250.ece. 
 104. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War, art. 55–59, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. 
 105. Id. at arts. 2–4. 
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Some have argued that states can be considered occupiers—even of 
areas where they do not declare themselves in control—as long as the 
putative occupiers have effective control.  For instance, in 2005, the 
International Court of Justice opined that Uganda could be considered 
the occupier of Congolese territory, over which it had “substituted [its] 
own authority for that of the Congolese Government,” even in the 
absence of a formal military administration.106  Some have argued that 
this shows that occupation may occur even in the absence of a full-scale 
military presence, thus claiming that this renders Israel an occupier 
under the Fourth Geneva Convention.107  However, these claims are 
clearly without merit.  First and foremost, Israel does not fulfill the 
conditions of being an occupier; in particular, Israel does not exercise 
the functions of government in Gaza, and it has not substituted its 
authority for the de facto Hamas government.  Secondly, Israel cannot 
project effective control in Gaza.  Indeed, Israelis and Palestinians know 
well that projecting such control would require an extensive military 
operation amounting to the armed conquest of Gaza.  In the recent War 
in Gaza, Israel targeted a Hamas presence in Gaza and did not attempt 
to, nor did it, occupy Gaza as a whole. 
Military superiority over a neighbor does not itself constitute occupation.  
If it did, the United States  would have to be considered the occupier of 
Mexico and Canada, Egypt the occupier of Libya, Iran the occupier of 
Afghanistan, and Russia the occupier of Latvia, among many others. 
Moreover, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that foes of Israel that 
claim that Israel has legal duties as the “occupier” of Gaza are insincere 
in their legal analysis.  If Israel were indeed properly considered an 
occupier, under Article 43 of the Regulations attached to the Fourth 
Hague Convention of 1907, Israel would be required to take “all the 
measures in [its] power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public 
order and safety.”108  Thus, those who contend that Israel is in legal 
occupation of Gaza must also support, and even demand, that Israelis 
conduct military operations in order to disarm Palestinian terror groups 
and militias. 
 
 106. Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), 
2005 I.C.J. No. 116 (Dec. 19), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/116/ 
10455.pdf?PHPSESSID=ad1c883c1ab2b3e16bfed34ad53663d5. 
 107. HARVARD PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POLICY AND CONFLICT RESEARCH, 
REVIEW OF THE APPLICABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW TO THE OCCUPIED 
PALESTINIAN TERRITORY (July 2004), http://opt.ihlresearch.org/index.cfm?fuseaction 
=Page.viewPage&pageId=768. 
 108.  Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex, 
Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539.  The French text is authoritative and uses the 
relevant phrase “l’ordre et la vie publics.” Adam Roberts & Richard Guelff, Documents 
on the Laws of War 68 (3d ed. 2000). 
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Additionally, claims of occupation necessarily rely upon a belief that 
the occupying power is not the true sovereign of the occupied territory.  
For that reason, those who claim that Israel occupies Gaza must believe 
that the border between Israel and Gaza is an international border 
between separate sovereignties.  Yet, many of those claiming that Gaza 
is occupied, such as John Dugard and Richard Falk, simultaneously and 
inconsistently claim that Israel is legally obliged to open the borders 
between Israel and Gaza.  However, no sovereign state is required to 
open its international borders. 
2. Israeli Duties Regarding the Supply of Gaza 
In any event, due to internal political considerations, as well as several 
rulings by the Israeli Supreme Court, Israel continues not only to 
maintain the flow of basic humanitarian supplies such as food, medicine, 
and water to the Palestinian population of Gaza, but, in many cases, 
Israel supplies the items itself.  In the case Al-Bassiouni Ahmed v. Prime 
Minister,109 the Israeli Supreme Court implied that it interpreted domestic 
administrative law as requiring the Israeli government to maintain a 
minimum flow of necessary, Israeli-supplied humanitarian goods when 
engaging in retorsional acts, such as cutting off the Israeli electricity 
supply to Gaza.  Contrary to widespread allegations, Israel has not cut 
off 100 percent of the fuel previously delivered to Gaza, but according to 
the Defense Ministry, by January 6, 2008, Israel had curtailed it by 
approximately thirteen percent.110  Indeed, it is estimated that Israel still 
provides $500 million worth of goods and services to the Gaza Strip 
each year.111 
Aside from the laws of occupation, there may be duties to permit the 
passage of relief supplies to Gaza, but Israel abides by these duties as 
well, as will be demonstrated later in this section. 
 
 109. HCJ 9132/07 Al-Bassiouni Ahmed v. The Prime Minister [Jan. 30, 2008] 
(Unpublished). 
 110. Nidal al-Mughrabi, Palestinians Ration Gaza Power After Fuel Cuts, REUTERS, 
Jan. 6, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSL06549779. 
 111. Michael I. Krauss, Collective Punishment and Newspeak, AMERICAN THINKER, Feb. 
24, 2008, http://www.americanthinker.com/2008/02/collective_punishment_and_news.html. 
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3. Article 23 of the Fourth Geneva Convention 
Article 23 of the Fourth Geneva Convention requires parties to certain 
conflicts to permit transit to enemy civilian populations of a limited 
number of items and under a limited set of conditions.112  However, the 
fighting in and around the Gaza Strip is not a conflict covered by the 
Fourth Geneva Convention; the conflict is not between state parties to 
the Convention, and Gaza is not occupied territory.113  Therefore, Israel 
is not bound by Article 23. 
Even if Israel were bound by the Fourth Geneva Convention, Israel 
would be acting in full compliance with international law.  Article 23 of 
the Fourth Geneva Convention permits states such as Israel to cut off 
fuel supplies and electricity to territories such as Gaza.  Article 23 only 
requires a party to permit passage of food, clothing, and medicines intended 
for children under fifteen, expectant mothers, and maternity cases.114  
Were Article 23 to apply, Israel would still be under no obligation to 
permit the passage of electricity, fuel, or any items other than food, clothing, 
or medicine.  Moreover, under Article 23, Israel would be under no 
obligation to provide anything itself; Israel would only be required not to 
interfere with consignments of food and so forth sent by others for the 
benefit of children under the age of fifteen, mothers of newborns, and 
pregnant women.115 
Finally, under Article 23, a party can block passage even of food, clothing, 
and medicine—even for the aforementioned  population groups—if it 
has serious grounds for suspecting that the items would be intercepted 
before reaching their destination, or that the items may benefit the 
enemy’s economy by substitution.116  Israel has excellent grounds for 
fearing both of these results, especially after Hamas seized fourteen Red 
Crescent trucks carrying humanitarian aid on February 7, 2008, on the 
pretext that only Hamas may decide how to distribute aid in Gaza 
(Hamas redistributed the food products and medical supplies to Hamas-
run ministries).117 
Additionally, critics of Israel tend to ignore Hamas’ continued 
mismanagement of the aid and fuel supplies that it does receive.  Hamas 
 
 112. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of 
War, art. 23, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. 
 113. Id. art. 2. 
 114. Id. art. 23. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Associated Press, Hamas Seizes Convoy of Food Meant for Palestinian Red 
Crescent, JERUSALEM POST, Feb. 7, 2008, http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid= 
1202246347331&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull. 
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misuses some of the fuel that Israel supplies to it.  The fuel is not only 
used to power factories manufacturing projectiles,118 but is also used, for 
example, to illuminate the underground tunnels which are used to 
smuggle in weaponry from Egyptian Sinai.  The Israeli-supplied fuel is 
then used to target Israeli residential, commercial, and industrial areas.119  
The IDF even caught terrorists attempting to smuggle potassium 
nitrate—which is used to manufacture explosives and Qassam rockets—
into Gaza in large sacks labeled as EU humanitarian aid; the sacks were 
branded “EEC 2 Sugar Exported From EU.”120 
Hamas has also attacked Israeli vehicles delivering aid even where it 
had no intent to divert the aid.  On April 27, 2008, Hamas militiamen 
attacked aid trucks filled with fuel at the Nahal Oz crossing between 
Israel and Gaza, forcing the trucks to turn around.121 
Furthermore, the Jerusalem Post reported eyewitnesses in Gaza who 
explained that, on at least four occasions, Hamas militiamen attacked 
and confiscated trucks loaded with fuel as they made their way from the 
Nahal Oz crossing to Gaza City.  The eyewitnesses added that the fuel 
supplies were taken to Hamas-controlled security installations throughout 
the city.122 Commenting on such attacks, Tony Blair, former British 
Prime Minister and current Quartet peace envoy, explained that “most 
people don’t understand—that we’re trying to urge Israel to get fuel into 
Gaza, and then the extremists come and kill the people bringing the fuel 
in.  It’s a crazy situation.”123  Thus time and time again, the aid that 
Israel has allowed to enter Gaza fails to reach the intended recipients: 
Palestinian civilians in need.124 
 
 118. Rebecca Anna Stoil et al., Senior Official: Iran Behind Rocket Fire, JERUSALEM 
POST, Mar. 3, 2008, http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2 
FShowFull&cid=1204546390634. 
 119. Matthew Levitt, Hamas’ Hidden Economy, L.A. TIMES, July 3, 2007, at A19. 
 120. Herb Keinon, EU Slams Terrorists’ Use of Phony Sugar Sacks, JERUSALEM POST, 
Dec. 30, 2007, http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1198517245928&pagename= 
JPost%2FJPArticle%2FPrinter. 
 121. Khaled Abu Toameh, PA: Hamas Disrupting Fuel Supplies to Gaza, JERUSALEM 
POST, Apr. 28, 2008, at 2. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Tom Gross, Mideast Dispatch Archive, May 18, 2008, http://www.tomgrossmedia. 
com/mideastdispatches/archives/000947.html. 
 124. Deutsche Presse Agentur (DPA), Hamas Confiscates Aid Trucks to Gaza, 
RELIEFWEB, Feb. 7, 2008, http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/MMAH-
7BM8XT?OpenDocument. 
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4.  Article 70 of the First Protocol Additional to the                               
Geneva Conventions of 1977 
Article 70 of the First Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions 
of 1977 creates a slightly broader duty regarding the provision of food, 
medical supplies, clothing, bedding, means of shelter, and “other supplies 
essential to the survival of the civilian population.”125  Israel, however, is 
not a party to the First Protocol, and is therefore not bound by the 
provisions of Article 70. 
Even if Israel were so bound, Article 70 does not list fuel and electricity 
as items for which passage must be permitted.  Moreover, Article 70 
does not place any duty on warring parties to supply the required items. 
It imposes a general duty on all states to organize “relief actions,” and 
requires warring parties not to interfere with the actions.  Thus, under 
Article 70, Israel would have no obligation to provide fuel or electricity; 
indeed, it would not even have any particular duty to provide food and 
medicine.  At most, Article 70 would require Israel to permit transit to 
others’ shipments of food and medicine, which Israel already does 
without reference to Article 70. 
5.  Customary Duties 
More generally, the Israeli Justice Ministry has acknowledged a duty 
under customary international law not to interfere with the supply of 
basic humanitarian items such as food and medicine.  The Israeli Supreme 
Court has also enforced this duty in several decisions (for instance, Al-
Bassiouni Ahmed v. Prime Minister,126 on January 30, 2008). 
Regrettably, some Israelis have summarized this acknowledged duty 
expansively and inaccurately, requiring that Israel ensure a minimum 
necessary supply of food, fuel, and electricity to prevent starvation or a 
humanitarian crisis.127  Even if the duty were as broad as this misstatement 
suggests, Israel has not breached its duty by cutting off Israeli fuel; Israel 
has only reduced supplies, while Gaza maintains more than sufficient 
supplies for basic humanitarian needs. 
Israel is not required by its customary general humanitarian duties to 
itself provide required items, only not to interfere with their passage.  
Moreover, fuel and electricity are almost certainly not items that Israel 
 
 125. See Geneva Protocol, supra note 18, art. 70. 
 126. HCJ 9132/07 Al-Bassiouni Ahmed v. The Prime Minister [Jan. 30, 2008] 
(Unpublished). 
 127. Robbie Sabel, Analysis: Is Gaza Blockade a Legitimate Tool of War?, JERUSALEM 
POST, Feb. 11, 2008, http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?c=JPArticle&cid=1202657 
415718&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull. 
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or other warring parties are required to supply.  Additionally, Israel is 
not the sole available source of fuel and electricity to Gaza; certainly 
Egypt, for example, is available to provide these resources.  Therefore, 
even if it were true that, as British Foreign Secretary David Miliband 
and Development Secretary Douglas Alexander stated, “without a steady 
supply of electricity hospitals cannot function, pumping stations and 
sewage systems fail, and access to clean water is denied,”128 Israel would 
not be required to permit passage of fuel and electricity. Moreover, given 
the likelihood of Hamas diversions of assistance, even the customary 
rule permits Israel to interfere with the passage of humanitarian items to 
ensure that they do not reach the wrong hands or benefit the armed 
efforts or economy of the enemy. 
Beyond these customary duties, one Israeli wrote that “the international 
community . . .  regards Israel as continuing to have some responsibility 
for ensuring supplies to the civilian population” because Gaza “depends” 
on Israel for its electricity and water after local Palestinian mismanagement 
of water supplies, several decades of Israeli military administration, Israeli 
control of Gazan airspace, and continuing military clashes.  However, 
there is no legal basis for the stated expectations of the “international 
community.”129 
None of the grounds referenced provide a legal basis for claiming that 
Israel must supply Gaza with electricity or the like: 
• Dependence on foreign supply—whether it be Gazan 
dependence on Israeli electricity, European dependence on 
Arab oil, or Somali dependence on foreign food aid—does not 
create a legal duty to continue the supply.  Absent specific 
treaty requirements, countries may cut off oil sales to other 
states at any time; 
• Neither Israel, nor any other country, is required to supply goods 
in response to its foes’ resource mismanagement or lack of natural 
bounty; 
• There is no precedent or legal text that creates legal duties on 
the basis of a former military administration.  For instance, as 
the above quoted Israeli wrote, no one has ever argued that 
 
 128. Karin Laub, Electricity Key Weapon in Gaza War, USA TODAY, Feb. 9, 2008, 
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2008-02-09-1257011926_x.htm. 
 129. See Sabel, supra note 127. 
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Egypt has legal duties to supply goods to Gaza due to its former 
nineteen-year military occupation of the Gaza Strip;130 
• Control of airspace does not create a legal duty to supply goods.  
For instance, U.N. Security Council-ordered no-fly zones in 
Iraq,131 Libya132 and Bosnia133 were not seen as the source of 
any legal duty to supply those countries with electricity, water, 
or other goods; and 
• Military clashes do not themselves create a legal duty to supply 
goods.  Only occupation as described by the Fourth Geneva 
Convention requires an occupier to ensure the supply of certain 
goods.  In cases of military clashes, the parties’ duty is limited 
to not interfering with the passage of certain humanitarian 
goods, as described above. 
It is noteworthy that British Foreign Secretary Miliband and Development 
Secretary Alexander, while condemning a roughly contemporaneous 
Palestinian terrorist bombing in Dimona,134 were not reported as having 
referred to the illegality of the Palestinian attack under international law, 
nor, indeed, to have made any reference whatsoever to the continued 
illegal Palestinian rocket attacks on Israeli towns like Sderot.  This is 
unfortunate, as the Dimona bombing and rocket attacks are clearly war 
crimes and illegal acts of terror under customary international law and 
international treaties such as the International Convention for the 
Suppression of Terrorist Bombings. 
6.  Imminent Humanitarian Crisis 
The legal arguments of the critics of Israel’s economic policies towards 
Gaza are baseless, and so too are the accompanying factual ones.  While 
the critics claim that Israeli policies are leading to calamitous results, the 
facts say otherwise. 
Israel’s critics have become increasingly vocal.  Predictions of an 
“imminent humanitarian crisis” in Gaza have been made at least as far 
back as 1996.135  In the year 2000, various Non Governmental Organizations 
(NGOs) turned up the heat on Israel by claiming the Jewish state was 
 
 130. Id. 
 131. S.C. Res. 686, U.N. Doc. S/RES/686 (Mar. 2, 1990). 
 132. S.C. Res. 686, U.N. Doc. S/RES/748 (Mar. 31, 1992). 
 133. S.C. Res. 686, U.N. Doc. S/RES/781 (Oct. 9, 1992). 
 134. Yaakov Katz and Rebecca Anna Stoil, Hamas: Dimona Bombers Came from 
Hebron, JERUSALEM POST, Feb. 4, 2008, http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1202 
064579209&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FShowFull. 
 135. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ISRAEL’S CLOSURE OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA 
STRIP, Vol. 8, No. 3(E) (July 1996), http://hrw.org/reports/1996/Israel1.htm. 
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responsible for the “imminent humanitarian crisis/disaster” in the Gaza 
Strip.136  Such terminology was mobilized again in 2001,137 and annually 
since then: in 2002,138 2003,139 2004,140 2005,141 2006,142 2007143 and 
2008.144 How has the Gaza Strip been “on the verge” of a humanitarian 
crisis for more than ten years? 
It is interesting to compare the use of the term “humanitarian crisis” as 
applied to the Gaza Strip with other locations described in the same 
manner—post-cyclone Myanmar, for example.  The cyclone was a true 
disaster, which left “upwards of one million people . . . in need of shelter and 
life-saving assistance.”145  Another use of the term “imminent humanitarian 
crisis/disaster” was used in relation to Darfur, where 300,000 were murdered 
and 2.5 million people fled their homes.146  Needless to say, any suffering in 
Gaza resulting from Israeli defensive measures pales in comparison. 
 
 136. See, e.g., NADIA HAJAB, Gaza’s humanitarian crisis: Who’s to blame for what, 
MIDDLE EAST CHILDREN’S ALLIANCE http://www.mecaforpeace.org/article.php?id=267. 
 137. Frank Gardner, Crisis Looms in Gaza, BBC.COM, June 15, 2001, http://news. 
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/1389843.stm. 
 138. See, e.g., Press Release, United Nations Relief and Works Agency, UNRWA 
Launches $94 Million Appeal for West Bank and Gaza No. HQ/G/25/2002, (Dec. 10, 
2002), http://www.un.org/ News/Press/docs/2002/PAL1932.doc.htm. 
 139. See, e.g., the Electronic Intifada website, which wrote, “investigation into the 
extent and causes of Palestinian poverty, in January 2003, the humanitarian situation in 
the Occupied Palestinian Territories has deteriorated sharply.  Poverty levels 
and unemployment are now reaching crisis proportions creating a humanitarian crisis, 
the levels of which . . . ha[ve] not been seen in fifty years.”  CHRISTIAN AID, THE ELECTRONIC 
INTIFADA, THE HUMANITARIAN CRISIS AND PROSPECTS FOR THE ROADMAP TO PEACE (July 
28, 2003), http://electronicintifada.net/v2/article1757.shtml. 
 140. BBC, U.N. WARNS OF ‘GROWING GAZA CRISIS’ (Oct. 7, 2004), http://news. 
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3723850.stm. 
 141. See, e.g., CARE, PALESTINIANS’ ONGOING HUMANITARIAN CRISIS DEEPENING 
IN GAZA (Aug. 24, 2005), http://www.jerusalemites.org/press_release/2005/24-8-2005.htm. 
 142. See, e.g., B’TSELEM, GAZA HUMANITARIAN CRISIS—A JOINT STATEMENT BY 
ISRAEL’S LEADING HUMAN RIGHTS ORGANIZATIONS (Nov. 16, 2006), http://www.btselem.org/ 
English/Gaza_Strip/20061116_Brief_on_Gaza.asp. 
 143. See, e.g., B’TSELEM, PRESS RELEASE, URGENT APPEALS FROM ISRAELI HUMAN RIGHTS 
GROUPS TO ISRAELI DEFENSE MINISTER: OPEN GAZA’S BORDERS TO PREVENT A HUMANITARIAN 
CRISIS (June 17, 2007), http://www.btselem.org/english/press_releases/20070617.asp. 
 144. CNN, RIGHTS GROUPS: HUMANITARIAN ‘IMPLOSION’ GRIPS GAZA (Mar. 6, 
2008), http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/03/06/gaza.crisis/?iref=hpmostpop.  In 
one of the few instances in which Israel was allowed to reply, the CNN noted, “Israel 
denounced the 16-page report, saying it is merely defending itself and calling the notion 
of a humanitarian crisis ‘fabricated.’” 
 145. ITV, BURMA DEATH TOLL ‘COULD BE 100,000’ (May 7, 2008), http://www. 
itv.com/News/Articles/Burma-humanitarian-crisis-grows-646089661.html. 
 146. CBC NEWS, THE CRISIS IN DARFUR, A TIMELINE (July 14, 2008), http://www. 
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Moreover, Israel has gone to extraordinary lengths to protect the 
citizens of Gaza, having established the “Gaza Coordination and Liaison 
Administration” (CLA), where representatives of the IDF and government 
ministries work day and night to provide for the humanitarian needs of 
the Gaza citizens.147 During the recent operation in Gaza this past winter, 
for example, CLA officials worked with representatives from international 
organizations and the Israeli government to coordinate medical aid and 
distribute food and equipment including 37,159 tons of food, medical 
supplies, and medications.148 
CLA commander Col. Nir Press spoke candidly of Hamas’ “well-oiled 
media and propaganda machine, which has succeeded in creating 
humanitarian ‘crises’ out of thin air.”149  He gave as an example Israel’s 
decision to suspend fuel supplies in early 2008 after a Palestinian attack 
on the Nahal Oz fuel depot.150  Before restricting the supply, Israel filled 
all gas tanks in Gaza to their maximum.  Yet, “taking advantage of this 
as a PR opportunity,” Hamas refused to draw on the fuel and “sent 
hundreds of people to gas stations in Gaza to stand with buckets in a 
long line, giving the impression that there was a fuel shortage in the 
Strip.”151 The stunt was only called off after journalists “contacted 
Palestinian newspapers and Gaza-based industrialists to explain that the 
tankers were, in fact, full, but that Hamas was purposely not drawing the 
fuel.  As a result, internal Palestinian pressure mounted, and Hamas had 
no choice but to distribute the fuel.”152 
The conflated message of the NGOs and the Hamas authorities in 
Gaza manipulates a difficult situation to reap political and financial 
gains.  Some of the alarmism regarding the humanitarian crisis in Gaza 
can be attributed to the pecuniary interests of the various charities and 
political interest groups that have made Gaza their primary cause.  Still, 
it is striking how, year after year, in almost verbatim fashion, donor-
states, NGOs, and well-meaning individuals are persuaded to donate 
extraordinarily outsized sums to forestall an “imminent humanitarian 
crisis/disaster” that never actually materializes.  In fact, “since 1993, 
 
 147. Yaakov Katz, Security and Defense: A Colonel of Hope, JERUSALEM POST, Aug. 1, 
2008,  http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1215331161934&pagename=JPost% 2FJP 
Article%2FShowFull. 
 148. ISRAEL MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HUMANITARIAN AID TO GAZA DURING IDF 
OPERATION (Jan. 18, 2009), http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Communiques/2009/ 
Humanitarian_aid_to_Gaza_following_6_month_calm.htm. 
 149. Justus Weiner, A Free Lunch for Hamas, THE JERUSALEM POST, Feb. 8, 2009, 
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1233304710842&pagename=JPArticle%2FS
howFull. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
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Palestinians have received more than $1.3 billion in U.S. economic 
assistance via USAID projects” alone.153  In fact, the Palestinians are the 
largest per capita recipients of foreign aid worldwide.154 
In addition, the Washington Institute for Near East Policy has pointed 
out that as of 2002, based upon contemporary prices, Palestinians in the 
West Bank and Gaza have received “$161 per person per year compared 
to $68 per person annually (at today’s prices) under the four-year Marshall 
Plan, meaning the Palestinians have gotten more than twice as much aid 
for twice as long as Europe received under the Marshall Plan.”155  
Commenting on the figures, Deputy Director for Research Patrick Clawson 
explains that “[t]he biggest single barrier to Palestinian growth is their 
violence against Israel, which forces Israel to impose closures and 
curfews.”156  An old joke is that the definition of chutzpah is murdering 
one’s parents and then begging the court’s mercy on the grounds that the 
defendant is an orphan.157  A new definition might be initiating a war 
while violating international humanitarian law and then claiming victim-
hood on the grounds of the suffering resulting from said war. 
The “imminent humanitarian crisis/disaster” chorus is not only 
exaggerated, but it is also completely wrong.  In the words of the Israeli 
Foreign Ministry, the critics “should point their criticism toward the 
Hamas terrorist organization that controls the Gaza Strip.”  A ministry 
spokesman stated that Israel allows shipments of food, medicine, fuel 
and electricity to Gaza because it doesn’t want a humanitarian crisis, 
but . . . there is “foolproof” evidence that Hamas diverts supplies for 
“terrorist use.”  He continued, “[i]f only the Palestinians choose to cease 
their pointless and indiscriminate firing of rockets against hundreds of 
thousands of Israeli civilians, the entire region would return to . . . normal.”158 
 
 153. USAID TRANSFERS $20 MILLION TO PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY (Dec. 30, 2004), 
http://domino.un.org/unispal.nsf/fd807e46661e3689852570d00069e918/ebafd5513e309
52b85256f80005734be!OpenDocument. 
 154. Paul Morro, CRS Report RS22370 U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians (Dec. 
22, 2006), http://www.coherentbabble.com/CRS/CRS-RS22370.pdf]. 
 155. Patrick Clawson, The Palestinians’ Lost Marshall Plans, THE WASHINGTON 
INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY, Aug. 9, 2002, http://www.thewashingtoninstitute.org/ 
templateC06.php?CID=406. 
 156. Id. 
 157. JACK ACHIEZER GUGGENHEIM, JEWISH LAW COMMENTARY, THE SUPREME 
CHUTZPA, http://www.jlaw.com/Commentary/SupremeChutzpah.html (last visited Sept. 
21, 2009). 
 158. CNN, Rights Groups: Humanitarian ‘implosion’ Grips Gaza, Mar. 6, 2008, 
http://edition.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/03/06/gaza.crisis/?iref=hpmostpop. 
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In the wake of Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza in 2005, the Palestinian 
Authority (PA) rejected “the opportunity to consolidate real economic 
and political authority”159 and thereby declined to “stimulate progress 
towards peace in the region.”160  Instead, the PA permitted armed gangs 
to destroy 200 dunams161 of greenhouse space, as well as computers and 
advanced irrigation systems that Israel left behind following its 
withdrawal.162  Palestinian militants firebombed churches, kidnapped 
journalists, and even kidnapped foreign aid workers.  In October 2003— 
prior to Israel’s departure from Gaza—terrorists ambushed and murdered 
three Americans who accompanied U.S. government officials who came 
to Gaza to interview Palestinian applicants for the prestigious Fulbright 
student scholarship.163  These violent activities culminated with the 
Hamas terrorists who took control over Gaza, throwing rival PA gunmen 
off rooftops to their deaths.164 
Two relatively unknown features of Gaza are worthy of mention in 
relation to the alleged perpetual “humanitarian crisis” that is supposedly 
about to erupt.  First, Gaza’s offshore gas deposits (confirmed with British 
Gas) are worth an estimated $2 billion165 (even prior to the upsurge in 
the price of fossil fuels during the past years).  If the Hamas government 
can stabilize the political situation long enough to install platforms to 
bring the gas to the surface, Hamas can reap the benefits of these offshore 
gas deposits.  Secondly, the population of Gaza is comparatively healthy 
and well educated.  In fact, classic indicators of the standard of living 
place Gaza in a reasonably strong position. Life expectancy in the Gaza 
Strip is 72.16 years,166 higher than Russia (65.94 years),167 the Bahamas, 
 
 159. Aaron David Miller, Why Gaza May Spell a New Start, INT’L HERALD TRIB., 
May 5, 2005, at 7. 
 160. G8 Statement: Gaza Withdrawal and the Road Ahead to Middle East Peace, 1 
PUB. PAPERS 1019, 1019–20 (June 10, 2004). 
 161. The dunam is a unit of land area equivalent to one thousand square meters or 
approximately one-fourth acre. The Israel Project, http://www.theisraelproject.org/site/ 
apps/nl/content2.asp?c=hsJPK0PIJpH&b=886017&ct=1181575 (last visited July 25, 2009). 
 162. Arnon Regular, Palestinian Militants Ransack Former Gush Katif Greenhouses, 
HAARETZ, Feb. 10, 2006, http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=6812 
71&contrassID=1&subContrassID=1. 
 163. Fox News, Explosion in Gaza Strip Kills Three Americans, Oct. 15, 2003, 
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,100102,00.html. 
 164. Eric Westervelt, Fatah, Hamas Battle in Gaza Threatens Government, NPR, 
June 12, 2007, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=10988462. 
 165. Tim Butcher, Gaza Doesn’t Need Aid: It Has a £2bn Gas Field, THE DAILY 
TELEGRAPH, Nov. 7, 2007, http://www.lexisnexis.com.sally.sandiego.edu/us/lnacademic/ 
results/docview/docview/co?docLindInd. 
 166. CIA, THE WORLD FACTBOOK 2008 236 (2008), available at https://www.cia. 
gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html. 
 167. Miguel Barrientos, Life Expectancy at Birth—Country Comparison, Jan.1, 
2008, http://www.indexmundi.com/g/r.aspx?t=50&v=30. 
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(65.72 years),168 India (69.25 years),169 Ukraine (68.06 years),170 and 
Glasgow East (in Scotland), where male life expectancy is 69.3 years.171  
Similarly, Gaza has a much lower infant mortality rate (21.88 deaths/1,000 
live births)172 than Angola (182.31 deaths/1,000 live births),173 Iran (36.93 
deaths/1,000 live births),174 India (32.31 deaths/1,000 live births),175 
Egypt (28.36 deaths/ 1,000 live births),176 and Brazil (26.67 deaths/1,000 
live births).177  Perhaps the most astonishing fact, in light of the sensationalist 
media coverage damning Gaza’s chances for a better future, is that 
literacy in Gaza stands at a staggering 92.4%.178 This is far higher than 
India (47.8%),179 Egypt (59.4%),180 and even wealthy Saudi Arabia 
(70.8%).181 
Likewise, contrary to common mythology that the Gaza Strip is “the 
most densely populated territory in the world,”182 the Gaza Strip is 
unequivocally less densely populated than an array of other locales 
around the world, including a number of economic success stories.  
According to the Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2004–2005, 
the population per square mile in the Gaza Strip was 8,666, while 
Monaco had a population density of 41,608 per square mile, Singapore, 
 
 168. Id. 
 169. Miguel Barrientos, India Life Expectancy at Birth, Jan. 1, 2008, http://www. 
indexmundi.com/india/life_expectancy_at_birth.html. 
 170. Miguel Barrientos, Ukraine Life Expectancy at Birth, Jan. 1, 2008, http://index 
mundi.com/ukraine/life_expectancy_at_birth.html. 
 171. FactCheck: Glasgow Worse than Gaza?-Channel 4 News, July 7, 2008, http:// 
www.channel4.com/news/articles/society/health/factcheck+glasgow+worse+than+gaza/23
20267. 
 172. The World Factbook, supra note 166. 
 173. Miguel Barrientos, Infant Mortality Rate—Country Comparison, Jan. 1, 2008, 
http://indexmundi.com/g/r.aspx?c=tp&v=29. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id. 
 178. The World Factbook, supra note 166. 
 179. Miguel Barrientos, Literacy—Country Comparison, Jan. 1, 2008, http://www. 
indexmundi.com/g/r.aspx?c=in&v=39. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Andrew Kennis, The World’s Largest Prison, CUNY GRADUATE CENTER 
ADVOCATE, Dec. 2008, http://web.gc.cuny.edu/advocate/DEC03ISSUE/dec03%20articles% 
20web%20format/Dec03Gaza.htm.  See also BBC, Key Maps (Israel and the Palestinians in 
Depth), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/spl/hi/middle_east/03/v3_israel_palestinians/ 
maps/html/population_settlements.stm (referring to Gaza as “one of the most densely populated 
tracts of land in the world”). 
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17,751; Gibraltar, 11,990; Hong Kong, 17,833; and Macau had a population 
density nearly ten times that of the Gaza Strip (71,466) in 2003.183 
D.  Legality of Israeli Military Actions under                                
International Human Rights Law 
Under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Israel 
is required to ensure the protection of certain rights “within its territory,”184 
including the right to life.185  The application of these rights to Gaza is 
far from clear.  Israel does not exercise authority or control over Gaza.  
Thus, unless Gaza is part of the sovereign territory of Israel, it is impossible 
to argue that Gaza is Israeli “territory,” in which case the rights under 
the Covenant clearly do not apply. 
Moreover, even if Gaza is part of the sovereign territory of Israel, and 
therefore subject to the Covenant, Israel has abided by its legal duties.  
For instance, Article 12 guarantees liberty of movement.186  However, 
the same article also authorizes subjecting the liberty of movement to 
restrictions “necessary to protect national security, public order, public 
health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others.”187  Thus, it is 
clear that Israel may block the travel of Gazans for security reasons. 
More broadly, it has been recognized that the Covenant has little 
application in combat.  Some argue that human rights law is displaced 
altogether by a situation of war.188  Others claim that human rights law 
continues to apply, but admit that the meaning of such rights must be 
established by the rules of international humanitarian law.189  Either 
way, Israel is protecting the human rights of the Palestinian residents of 
the Gaza Strip by abiding by international humanitarian law. 
E.  Other Israeli Duties under International Law 
Some provisions of international law impose upon Israel duties to act 
against Gaza and the Palestinian terrorists who are based there. 
 
 183. Alex Safian, Why Palestinians Still Live in Refugee Camps, CAMERA, Aug. 
14, 2005, http://www.camera.org/index.asp?x_context=7&x_issue=52&x_article=960. 
 184. Sarah Joseph et al., Article 2.1 in THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL 
AND POLITICAL RIGHTS, (2nd ed. 2004). 
 185. Id. art. 6.1. 
 186. Id. art. 12.1. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Mary O’Connell, War Crimes Research Symposium: The Role of Justice in 
Building Peace: To Kill or Capture Suspects in the Global War on Terror, 35 CASE W. 
RES. J. INT’L L. 325, 328, 330–32 (2003). 
 189. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9, 2004). 
WEINER BELL FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/30/2009  9:37 AM 
[VOL. 11:  5, 2009]  The Gaza War of 2009 
  SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 
 41 
First, as noted above, Israel has the duty to act to prevent and punish 
Palestinian acts of genocide covered by the Genocide Convention. 
Second, Israel has the duty, under Security Council Resolution 1373 
(a Chapter VII resolution), to take various steps against Palestinian 
terrorists. In addition to the required steps “the Council decided that all 
states should prevent and suppress the financing of terrorism, as well as 
criminalize the willful provision or collection of funds for such acts,” 
and the freezing of funds and financial assets “of persons who commit, 
or attempt to commit, terrorist acts or participate in or facilitate the 
commission of terrorist acts.”  Israel’s duties to prevent funding of terrorists 
are far-reaching. Under Resolution 1373, states must “refrain from 
providing any form of support, active or passive, to entities or persons 
involved in terrorist acts.”  Thus, arguably, Israel is forbidden to supply 
aid to the Palestinian Authority, knowing that part of it will be diverted 
to Hamas and other terrorist groups and will, therefore, become passive 
support for persons involved in terrorist acts.  Additionally, Israel is 
required by Resolution 1373 to “[p]revent the movement of terrorists or 
terrorist groups by effective border controls.”  This means that Israel is 
arguably required to continue maintaining strict controls on the passage 
of persons from Gaza to Israel.190 
These duties do not fall solely upon Israel.  Other states also are 
required to prevent and punish Palestinian acts of genocide and, pursuant 
to Resolution 1373, to “[c]ooperate, particularly through bilateral and 
multilateral arrangements and agreements, to prevent and suppress 
terrorist attacks and take action against perpetrators of such acts.”191 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The Palestinian–Israeli fighting in Gaza has been characterized by the 
extensive commission of war crimes, acts of terrorism, and acts of genocide 
by Palestinian fighters.  On the other hand, Israeli counter-measures 
have conformed with the requirements of international law, with the 
possible exception that Israel may be legally required to cut off aid to the 
Palestinians.  Israel may continue to impose economic sanctions and 
engage in military strikes including a full-scale assault on the Gaza Strip, 
as long as it continues to abide by the basic humanitarian rules of 
distinction and proportionality. 
 
 190. S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001). 
 191. Id. 
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Other states can, and must, do more to encourage compliance with 
international legal standards by fulfilling their own legal obligations, 
while refraining from raising specious charges against Israel.  International 
law requires Israel and other states to take measures to bring Palestinian 
war criminals and terrorists to justice, to prevent and punish Palestinian 
genocidal efforts, and to block the funding of Palestinian terrorist groups 
and those complicit with them. 
 
